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Tradition of Chilling Free Speech with
Defamation Laws
I. INTRODUcTION
Overshadowed by Singapore's economic success is the
established practice of the country's public officials aggressively
and successfully pursuing defamation suits against political
opponents as a means of stifling political dissent.' This practice,
which dates back to 1979,2 has not gone unnoticed by the
international community. Amnesty International (Amnesty) has
expressed its disdain for the way in which these defamation suits
stifle free speech. Amnesty stated that "this pattern of defamation
suits has been both unnecessary and disproportionate and that, by
undermining the requisite balance between the right to protection
of reputation and the right to free speech, has amounted to a
violation of the fundamental right to freely hold and peacefully
express one's opinions.",3 Moreover, both the New York-based
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights and the Vancouver-based
Lawyers Rights Watch Canada have also expressed their concern,
saying that "[t]he right to express oneself freely in public without
fear of reprisal has been severely compromised in Singapore.",
4
Ironically, the fundamental right to free speech is expressly
guaranteed in Article 14 of the Singapore Constitution.5 This right
is not absolute, however, as the Constitution also permits
1. Singapore courts have consistently granted judgments in favor of public officials.
See Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong, [1997] 3 S.L.R. 91, 113-14 (Sing.) (describing past
decisions on defamation cases involving public officials).
2. E.g., Lee Kuan Yew v. icyaretnam, [1979] t M.L.J. 281 (Sing.).
3. Amnesty International, Singapore: Defamation Suits Threaten Chee Soon Juan
and Erode Freedom of Expression (Nov. 2, 2101), at http://web.amnesty.org/library/eng-
sgp/index.
4. Singapore's High Court Denies Trial to Opposition Leader in Defamation Case,
THE CAN. PRESS, Apr. 4, 2003, 2003 WL 18252432.
5. SING. CONST. art. 14, § I(a).
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Parliament to impose restrictions on this right.' These restrictions
are laid out in Singapore's Defamation Act,7 which provides the
basis upon which defamation suits are brought into court.
This Comment argues that the series of defamation suits
brought by public officials constitutes a misuse of defamation laws
and an abuse of Singapore's judicial process to the point of chilling
free speech. To cure this injustice, this Comment proposes that
Singapore courts should adopt the public official exception, an
alternative standard drawn from other common law jurisdictions,
namely that of the United States, Britain, and Australia.
Part II provides background information on Article 14 of the
Singapore Constitution and the Defamation Act. Part II also
presents the pattern of defamation suits brought by public officials
against political opponents and foreign publications.
Part III argues that in order for the judiciary to uphold the
integrity of Singapore's judicial process, it needs to strike a balance
between two competing interests: the right to protect a public
official's reputation and the right to free speech. The judiciary, as
Part III explains, is the most appropriate branch of power to
correct this abuse of the judicial process, because it has the
authority under Singapore's Constitution to exercise judicial
review and safeguard the right of free speech from infringement by
members of the executive branch. The judiciary currently applies a
strict liability standard to defamation cases involving public
officials; this standard, however, as applied in three cases
presented in Part III, unfairly tips the balance in favor of
protecting public reputation. Hence, the judiciary needs to
reevaluate this strict liability standard.
Part III also proposes that the judiciary should apply the
public official exception and shift the burden of proof from the
defendant to the plaintiff to avoid chilling free speech with
defamation laws. There is an emerging trend in common law
jurisdictions of adopting the free speech principles underlying the
public official exception. Moreover, there is a hint of greater
tolerance for political dissent in Singapore, which means that when
the judiciary considers the country's local conditions, it can adopt
the public official exception without having to look beyond the
four corners of Singapore's Constitution.
6. Id. § 2(a).
7. Defamation Act, 1985, c. 75 (Sing.).
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Finally, Part IV concludes that by adopting the public official
exception the judiciary will not only ensure that the right to free
speech is adequately protected in this city-state, but it will also set
a good example for the rest of Asia.
II. BACKGROUND
Singapore's Constitution not only expressly guarantees the
fundamental right to free speech,8 but it also embodies the
principle of separation of powers. 9 The Constitution empowers
Singapore courts to exercise judicial review and to serve as a check
on the other branches of the government against constitutional
infringements on the right to free speech. Thus, the courts have
the duty to prevent members of the executive branch from
misusing defamation laws to muzzle political opponents.
A. Singapore's Constitution and Defamation Act
Founded in 1.819 as a British colony, Singapore is a
Commonwealth republic with its legal system based on the English
common law." Singapore's Constitution was established in 1959
and amended in 1965, when Singapore declared independence. 2
Section (1)(a) of Article 14 of Singapore's Constitution
expressly guarantees that "every citizen of Singapore has the right
to freedom of speech and expression. ' 3 This right is not absolute,
however, since section (2) provides that "Parliament may by law
impose (a) ... restrictions as it considers necessary or expedient in
the interest of the security of Singapore or any part thereof...
designed to protect the privileges of Parliament or to provide
against contempt of court, defamation or incitement to any
offence.. ,,4
8. SING. CONST. art. 14, § I(a).
9. E.g., Cheong Seok Leng v. Public Prosecutor, [1988] 2 M.L.J. 481, 487 (Sing.);
Attorney Gen. v. Lingle, [1995] 1 S.L.R. 696, 709 (Sing.); Teo Soh Lung v. Minister for
Home Affairs, [1989] S.L.R. 499, 1989 SLR LEXIS 310, at *53 (Sing.).
10. Thio Li-Ann, Recent Constitutional Developments: Of Shadows and Whips, Race,
Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs, 2002 SING. J. LEGAL STUD.
328, 341 (2002) [hereinafter Thio Li-Ann I].
11. CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2002: SINGAPORE,
461 (2002), available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html (last
updated Apr. 29, 2004) [hereinafter CIA].
12. See id.
13. SING. CONsT. art. 14.
14. Id. § 2(a).
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An example of one such restriction on the right to free speech
is Singapore's Defamation Act (Ch. 75). This Act gives rise to the
right to bring a defamation cause of action. Of particular relevance
is Article 14, entitled "Limitation of Privilege at Elections," which
provides: "A defamatory statement published by or on behalf of a
candidate in any election to the office of... Parliament ... shall
not be deemed to be published on a privileged occasion on the
ground that it is material to a question in issue in the
election ... ,,. This precludes the defense of qualified privilege,
which protects certain communications made in the interest of
society. Only Article 12 provides a qualified privilege, which is
solely extended to newspapers.16
In relation to Article 14, it is worth noting that Singapore's
unicameral Parliament is comprised of eighty-four seats, 7 of which
only three are constitutionally required to be held by opposition
parties."5 The People's Action Party (PAP) has been the ruling
majority since the country achieved independence in 1965.19 The
leader of PAP, Lee Kuan Yew, served as Singapore's first Prime
Minister from 1959 to 1990, after which he became Senior
Minister, and PAP Secretary-General Goh Chok Tong became the
nation's second and current Prime Minister.
B. The Pattern of Defamation Suits Brought by Public Officials
Against Political Opponents and Foreign Publications
According to Australian barrister Stuart Littlemore, who
once monitored Singapore's libel cases for the International
Commission of Jurists, the members of PAP have never lost a
single defamation suit.2' His calculations also indicate that
members of the PAP received twelve times the average amount of
15. Defamation Act, 1985, c. 75, § 14.
16. Id. § 12.
17. CIA,supra note 11, at 461.
18. Janet Matthews Information Services, Hilfe Country Report, Singapore: Politics,
May 3, 2000, LEXIS, Nexis Library, News File.
19. Eugene K. Tan, Law and Values in Governance: The Singapore Way, 30 H.K.L.J.
91, 93 (2000); see also BBC News, Chee Charged Again Over Unlicensed Speech, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/251794.stm (Jan. 9, 1999).
20. The Cabinet, Lee Kuan Yew, at http://www.cabinet.gov.sgp-smlee.htm (last
visited Apr. 29, 2004); CIA,supra note 11, at 461.
21. Eric Ellis, Singapore Authorities Use Libel Laws to Silence Critics, THE
AUSTRALIAN, Sept. 26, 2002, at B09.
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damages usually awarded.-2 The amount of damages awarded in
the following cases not only confirms Littlemore's assertions, but
also indicates the normative value that Singapore courts attach to
the reputation of public officials.
In 1979, J.B. Jeyaretnam of the Workers' Party was held
liable for slander against Lee when, at an election rally, he accused
Lee of abusing his office as Prime Minister by procuring
preferential treatment for his brother and wife to their personal
financial advantage.23 Finding that the slander was made for
political gain, the court awarded Lee S$130,000.24
Similarly, in 1989, Seow Khee Leng of the Singapore United
Front Party was held liable for slander against Lee for stating at a
1984 election rally that Lee was guilty of corruption because of his
criminal and dishonorable conduct as Prime Minister." The court
found that the slander was vicious in nature and awarded Lee
S$250,000.26
Lee has also brought defamation suits against foreign
publications. In 1990, the Far Eastern Economic Review was held
liable for slander when it published an article that asserted Lee
abused his office as Prime Minister by arresting sixteen church
workers in connection with a clandestine communist network
under the Internal Security Act. Finding that there was express
malice, the court awarded Lee S$250,000.25
More recently, in 2002, Lee brought a defamation suit against
the U.S. business news wire Bloomberg for publishing an article
that attributed to nepotism the appointment of Lee's daughter-in-
law, Ho Ching, to executive director of a Government-owned
investment company.:79 Interestingly, the article was not printed in
Singapore, and Ho, who was arguably the person most defamed by
the article, was not a party to the suit.3 Bloomberg eventually
settled the case for S$550,000.
31
22. Id.
23. Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong, [1997] 3 S.L.R. at 113.
24. Id.
25. Id. (citing Lee Kuan Yew v. Seow Khee Leng, [1989] 1 M.L.J. 172 (Sing.)).
26. Id. at 114.
27. Id. (citing Lee Kuan Yew v. Davis, [19901 1 M.L.J. 390 (Sing.)).
28. Id.
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In comparison to the above cases, the highest award for
defamation thus far is the amount of S$600,000 that was given to
Prime Minister Goh, who sued Tang Liang Hong, a member of the
Workers' Party, for making defamatory statements in a telephone
interview with the local newspaper. 2 Each of the ten other public
official plaintiffs arising out of this case was also awarded damages,
none below the hundred thousand dollar mark. 3 The court wanted
to show its "indignation at the injury inflicted on the plaintiffs.
3 4
III. BALANCING Two COMPETING INTERESTS: THE RIGHT TO
PROTECT THE REPUTATION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS VIS-A-VIS THE
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH
In a forum for public discourse, opposing parties with
conflicting interests butt heads. On one side, the public official
charges in the name of reputation; on the other side, the private
individual charges in the name of free speech. It is the courts' duty
as the referee to maintain a balance between these two competing
interests. The fact that public officials have systematically brought
defamation suits to silence political dissent, and have won virtually
every suit, reveals that the Singapore judicial process has been
abused and the right of free speech undermined.
A. Separation of Powers: Upholding the Integrity of the Judicial
Process from Abuse by the Executive Branch
Singapore's Constitution embodies the principle of separation
of powers, and although judicial review is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it has been exercised and accepted in
practice. 5 As stated earlier, Part IV of the Constitution protects
fundamental liberties, including the guaranteed right of free
speech under Article 14.36 Thus, the Singapore judiciary is the best
custodian of the fundamental right to free speech, especially if
another branch of government infringes upon it. 7
32. Lee Kuan Yew v. Tang Liang Hong, 119971 3 S.L.R. at 105, 109.
33. Id. (listing the schedule of damages awarded to each of the public official
plaintiffs).
34. Id. at 118.
35. Thio Li-Ann 1, supra note 10, at 343-44.
36. SING. CONST. art. 14.
37. See Thio Li-Ann, An 'P for an ''? Singapore's Communitarian Model of
Constititional Adjudication, 27 H.K.L.J. 152, 153 (1997) [hereinafter Thio Li-Ann Ill.
(Vol. 26:315
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The pattern of defamation suits brought by members of the
executive branch amounts to such an infringement, and the
Singapore courts' application of a strict liability standard have
resulted in consistent rulings in favor of these public officials. Such
rulings have encouraged public officials to silence political dissent
and free speech to an alarming degree. This indicates that the strict
liability standard applied by the Singapore courts unjustly favors
protecting the reputations of public officials. Thus, to strike a
better balance between the interests of protecting a public
official's reputation and freedom of speech, the judiciary should
reexamine the standard it currently applies to defamation cases
involving public officials.
B. Determining the Natural and Ordinary Meaning of Words
Under a Strict Liability Standard
Under Singapore's common law, defamation is a strict
liability tort. The defendant's intent is irrelevant. 3' As the court in
Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur stated, "[w]hen [defamatory words
about] a person are published, the law presumes that the words are
false and the burden of proving that they are true is placed on the
defendant."39
The following three cases illustrate how Singapore courts
have a tendency under the strict liability standard to accept only
one defamatory meaning in the defendant's statements without
considering other possible natural and ordinary meanings. Since
the Singapore government eliminated all jury trials in Singapore
since 1969,4° the judge determines the nature of the statements
made. The danger with this approach is the potential lack of
objectivity when the judge alone tries to determine whether an
ordinary person could perceive the defendant's statements to be
defamatory, especially since judges in Singapore are appointed by
the President 4' and the plaintiffs are members of the executive
branch.
38. Scott L. Goodroad, The Challenge Of Free Speech: Asian Values v. Unfettered
Free Speech, An Analysis Of Singapore and Malaysia in the New Global Order, 9 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 259, 299 (1998).
39. Lee Kuan Yew v. Vinocur, [1996] 2 S.L.R. 542 (Sing.) (citing DUNCAN & NEILL
ON DEFAMATION para. 17.02 (2nd ed.)).
40. David J. Thorpe, Some Practical Points About Starting a Business in Singapore:
"Give Me Liberty or Give Me Wealth, " 27 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1039, 10J52 (1994).
41. CIA, supra note 11, at 461.
2003]
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1. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew
In 1986, then Prime Minister Lee instructed the Minister for
National Development, Teh Cheang Wan (Teh), to take a leave of
absence amidst an impending investigation against Teh for
corruption.42 Less than a month later, Teh was found dead from an
overdose of amytal barbituate; the coroner declared that Teh had
committed suicide.4' A Commission of Inquiry was subsequently
formed to investigate the allegations of corruption but not Teh's
suicide.44 The Commission found that no member of government,
apart from Teh, was involved in the alleged corruption.
This event formed the subject of a speech at an election rally
in 1988, where the Secretary-General of the Workers' Party, J.B.
Jeyaretnam, directed the following questions at Lee:
41
Why hasn't the government conducted any inquiry to find out
how Mr. Teh Cheang Wan came by this poison [since it cannot,
under the Drugs Act, be bought over the counter]?... Teh
Cheang Wan wrote to the Prime Minister, I think a day before
his death ... [he] ended that letter by saying I am very sorry I
will do as you advise. My question to our Prime Minister from
here tonight is this. Did he respond to that letter from Mr. Teh
Cheang Wan? And if he did respond what was his response?
47
Following these statements, Lee brought an action against
Jeyaretnam for uttering slanderous speech injurious to his
character and reputation. Ultimately, in Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan
Yew, the Singapore Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's
judgment 4' that Jeyaretnam was liable for slander and awarded
Lee damages of S$260,000.o The court stated:
In determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the words
complained of, the sense or meaning intended by the appellant
uttering the words, or in which the respondent understood
them, is irrelevant. Extrinsic evidence is not admissible in
42. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, [199212 S.L.R. 310, 314 (Ct. of Appeal).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 315.
46. Id.
47. d. at 316.
48. Id.
49. See Lee Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam (No. 1), [19901 S.L.R. 688, 1990 SLR LEXIS
345 (Sing.).
50. Jeyaretnan v. Lee Kuan Yew, [199212. S.L.R. at 318.
[Vol. 26:315
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construing the words. The meaning must be gathered from the
words themselves and in the context of the entire speech made
by the appellant on that occasion. It is the natural and ordinary
meaning as understood by reasonable members of the audience
using their general knowledge and common sense. It is not
confined to a literal or strict meaning of the words, but includes
any inferences or implications which could reasonably be drawn
by such persons.51
Relying on this rule, the court held that because Jeyaretnam
questioned the honesty of the government in an earlier part of his
speech,52 an ordinary listener could understand his subsequent
questions to imply that the government attempted to cover up
Teh's suicide to avoid further investigation of Lee's possible
involvement." How exactly the court determined this to be the
natural and ordinary meaning of Jeyaretnam's statements is
unclear. Granted, when Jeyaretnam remarked, "[I]t was essential
for a government to tell the truth and nothing but the whole truth
and not to hide anything, '' 4 the ordinary listener would have
inferred from Jeyaretnam's subsequent questions that the
government had not been entirely honest or forthcoming about the
circumstances surrounding Teh's death. The court, however, held
that no inference was necessary, stating: "At that stage, it must
have been obvious to the listener that the appellant was suggesting
in clear terms, though in the form of questions, that there was a
'cover-up' by the government of Teh's suicide. "
The obviousness of such a conclusion is questionable at best.
Dishonesty does not necessarily entail a government cover-up. The
ordinary listener might have concluded that the government failed
to conduct an inquiry on Teh's suicide for reasons other than a
cover-up. The court did not consider whether Jeyaretnam's words
were capable of any other meaning and seemed all too ready to
accept what it thought to be the only natural and ordinary meaning
of his statements.
51. Id. at 318-19.
52. Id. at 315-16. (quoting Jeyaretnam in an earlier part of his speech, "I took up the
Prime Minister's statement that was made on National Day, I think, that the government
was an honest government and that the voters should vote for an honest government. And
I asked a number of questions bringing out specific instances and asked whether the
government was honest....
53. Id.at321.
54. Id. at 316.
55. Id. at 322.
20031
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2. Goh Chok Tong v. Tang Liang Hong
On December 1996, various newspapers attributed to Prime
Minister Goh a number of statements made during his election
campaign about Tang Liang Hong, a member of the Workers'
Party.i He allegedly called Tang a "Chinese chauvinist who held
radical views on the promotion of the Chinese language and
culture and that these views would undermine Singapore's racial
peace.,
57
Subsequently, Tang spoke at various election rallies,
discussing the issues that his party would raise to the Parliament.)
He responded to Goh's remarks about him being a Chinese
chauvinist:
Goh Chok Tong has resorted to hitting below the belt. He said
that I am anti-Christian and a Chinese chauvinist. [The PAP
and Goh] keep on repeating that because they believe that if a
lie is repeated a hundred times, a lie can become truth....
But they try to digress from the topic of election into trying to
put me on trial before Singa~oreans. The trial of my character is
not the issue of this election.
Goh's solicitors then sent Tang a letter, demanding a
withdrawal of the defamatory statements and a public apology)'
Tang did not comply with Goh's demands6' and left Singapore a
few days later.62 While in Malaysia, Tang did an interview with
Singapore's local newspaper, The Straits Times, and explained that
he had fled the country for fear that he might be arrested:6
[Tang said,] "They were building up this case against me. I
could see where it was all heading. I wanted to leave Singapore
and be given a chance to tell the world that I am not who they
say I am.
"Once I go back to Singapore, there is a possibility that I may
be locked up and not given a chance to defend myself," he
said....
56. Goh Chok Tong v. Tang Liang Hong, 119971 2 S.L.R. 641, 641 (Sing).
57. Id. at 649.
58. Id. at 653.
59. Id. at 654.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 655.
62. Id. at 656.
63. Id. at 657.
[Vol. 26:315
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When told that Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong had given an
assurance that he would not be arrested, he laughed, adding:
"Do you think I should believe him?"
[Tang] said that many years ago, Senior Minister Lee Kuan
Yew had given some Nanyang University students a similar
assurance. A few days later, some of them were arrested.
Mr. Tang, 61, said that he did not discount being arrested under
the Internal Security Act, especially since he had been accused
of playing "International" games.
In response to the above statements published in the article,
Goh brought a defamation suit against Tang. The Singapore High
Court in Goh Chok Tong v. Tang Liang Hong ruled that Tang was
liable for slander and awarded Goh damages. 5 The court stated:
[T]he 'natural and ordinary meaning' to be ascribed to the
publication is the meaning, including any inferential meanings,
which the publication read or heard in its entirety and in its
context would convey to the ordinary, reasonable, fair-minded
reader or listener... [A]lthough the alleged libelous
publication or the alleged slanderous words may convey
different meanings to different readers or listeners, a judge in
Singapore, as a finder of facts, is required by the common law to
determine the single and the right meaning which the
publication or words conveyed to the notional reasonable
reader or reasonable listener and, having identified it, the judge
is then to proceed to consider if it is defamatory of the
plaintiff.66
Based on this rule, the court interpreted Tang's explanation
of why he had fled the country as conveying to an ordinary reader
that Goh was "not an honest man, not a man of integrity and could
not be trusted"67 and that he "most probably would corruptly and
illegally use his power and influence as the Prime Minister of
Singapore to arrest the defendant under the Internal Security
Act."68 It is unclear exactly how the court determined this to be
"the single and the right meaning" of Tang's statements. Assuming
64. Brendan Pereira, I fled as l feared being arrested: Tang, THE STRAITS TIMES, Jan.
11, 1997, at 31.
65. Goh Chok Tong v. Tang Liang Hong, [1997] 2 S.L.R. at 667.
66. Id. at 659.
67. Id. at 661.
68. Id.
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
that Tang's statement, "I am not who they say I am," implies to the
ordinary reader that Goh was "not an honest man, not a man of
integrity," nevertheless, the judge provided little reasoning for his
conclusion that, "In my judgment what I have set out is the single
and the right meaning of the utterances in the article.'
'
6
The judge's interpretation, however, may not be "the single
and the right meaning." When Tang mentioned the Internal
Security Act (ISA), he was referring to Senior Minister Lee's past
actions.] Even if Goh were to invoke the ISA, the ordinary reader
might not necessarily conclude that he would corruptly and
illegally use his power to do so. Here, the court did not consider
whether Tang's words were capable of any other meaning, and
seemed all too ready to accept the damning definition offered by
Goh.
3. Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan
At an election rally in 2001, Chee Soon Juan, the Secretary-
General of the Singapore Democratic Party, raised questions
about the government's financial assistance to Indonesia in 1998."'
He told the public:
[W]hen we met Goh Chok Tong ... I asked him, "Mr Goh,
what happened to our money? What happened to this $17
billion?" He wouldn't answer.... My friends, it is your money
... not the Government's money... And this is that same
question that I want to ask Mr. Lee Kuan Yew today .... So Mr.
Lee Kuan Yew, I challenge you, tell us about this $17 billion
you loaned to Suharto.72
In response to the above statements, Lee brought a
defamation suit against Chee. On August 19, 2002, at a closed
hearing in private chambers, a senior judicial officer not only
entered summary judgment 73 but also denied Chee's request for
foreign lawyers (Queen Counsels Stuart Littlemore,74 William
69. Id.
70. Id. at 658.
71. See Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan, [2003] 3 S.L.R. 8, at *11 (Sing.) (LEXIS,
Singapore Law Reports).
72. Id.
73. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Trial Observation Report: The
Defamation Appeal of Dr. Chee Soon Juan 1 (2003), http://www.lchr.org/
workers-rights/wr se-asia/wr-singapore/wr chee/trial-observation-report_2003.pdf.
74. See Re Littlemore, [200211 S.L.R. 296, 297.
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Nicholas, and Martin Lee7'), leaving Chee to act as a pro se
litigant. On April 4, 2003, the High Court in Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee
Soon Juan denied Chee's appeal.76 The court stated:
The test as to what is the natural and ordinary
meaning of the Words has been set out in Rubber
Improvement Ltd & Anor v. Daily Telegraph Ltd where
Lord Reid said ... : "There is no doubt that in actions
for libel the question is what the words would convey to
the ordinary man.., so he can and does read between
the lines in the light of his general knowledge and
experience of world affairs. What the ordinary man
would infer without special knowledge has generally
been called the natural and ordinary meaning of the
words.... [S]ometimes it is not necessary to go beyond
the words themselves, as where the plaintiff has been
called a thief or a murderer. But more often the sting is
not so much in the words themselves as in what the
ordinary man will infer from them, and that is also
regarded as part of their natural and ordinary
meaning."77
Relying on this test, the court concluded that Chee's
statements imputed dishonesty against Lee, that Lee "concealed
the fact of the loan from Parliament and/or the public, and/or
deliberately misled Parliament and/or the public in relation to the
loan. ''75 It is unclear how the court determined this to be the
natural and ordinary meaning of Chee's statements. Granted,
when Chee challenged Lee to account for the loan, the ordinary
listener could have inferred Chee's imputation of dishonesty
against Lee.7 9 Lee's failure to address the issue of the loan,
however, did not necessarily imply, as the court suggested, that
Lee had "something discreditable to hide."8 The ordinary listener
could also conclude that Lee had legitimate reasons for not
responding to Chee's challenge. In other words, the court did not
consider whether Chee's words were capable of any other
75. See Re Nicholas, [20021 2 S.L.R. 296, 307.
76. Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan, [2003] 3 S.L.R. at *31.
77. Id. at *27.
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meaning, and was all too ready to accept Lee's interpretation of
Chee's statements.
C. Adopting the Public Official Exception in Place of the Strict
Liability Standard
Jeyaretnam, Tang, and Chee suggest that, under a strict
liability standard, the courts tend to accept, perhaps too readily,
the plaintiff's interpretation of the defendant's allegedly
defamatory statements. Under a no-jury trial system, this is not a
fair and objective approach to determine the natural and ordinary
meaning of words. As this section will explain, the defenses
currently available do not adequately protect the right to free
speech in cases where the plaintiff is a public official. To minimize
the chilling effect that defamation laws have on free speech,
Singapore courts should adopt the public official exception which
shifts the burden of proof from the defendant to the plaintiff.
1. Tipping the Scales in Favor of Protecting a Public Official's
Reputation at the Expense of Free Expression
When a public official in Singapore initiates a defamation suit,
safeguards for the defendant's right to free speech are limited in
the following ways. First, as already demonstrated, President-
appointed judges applying a strict liability standard in a no-jury
trial system brings into question the courts' objectivity in
determining the natural and ordinary meaning of the defendant's
statements. ' Second, under Singapore's Defamation Act, Article
14 specifically precludes qualified privilege as a defense for
persons make defamatory statements material to a question at
issue in the election. 2 Third, a person in an undischarged
bankruptcy or charged with a fine of more than S$2,000 is
automatically disqualified from membership in Parliament.13 As a
result, political opponents are barred from formal political activity
due to such fines and large damages awarded in defamation cases
involving public officials.
Thus, with the scales tipped in favor of protecting public
reputation, the Singapore courts in Jeyaretnam, Tang, Chee, Lee
Kuan Yew v. Seow Khee Leng, Lee Kuan Yew v. Davis, among
81. Supra Part 111(B).
82. Defamation Act, 1985, c. 75, § 14 (Sing.).
83. SING. CONsr. art. 45.
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others, have consistently ruled in favor of public officials. 4 In fact,
the local newspaper, The Straits Times, reported that Singapore
courts "have tended to accept the argument that, because
politicians are well-regarded here, they deserve higher damages to
protect and vindicate their reputations."' Admittedly, the courts'
justification for this position is that the public has an interest in the
"maintenance of public character." 6 To hold otherwise would
"deter sensitive and honorable men from seeking public
positions."" In addition, the court reasoned, "Persons holding
public office ... are equally entitled to have their reputations
protected as those of any other persons.""
Public officials and private individuals, however, should not
receive the same degree of protection for their reputation. Not
only do public officials have easy access to the mass media, which
provides them with a greater opportunity to be heard, but also, by
virtue of their status, they necessarily expose themselves to public
criticism." Moreover, the public officials in Singapore who have
pursued defamation suits against political opponents belong to the
ruling People's Action Party, which has held almost all of the seats
in Parliament ever since the country declared independence in
1965 ."0 Thus, with the limited safeguards for free expression,
political opponents, such as Jeyaretnam, Tang, and Chee, are
effectively deprived of any ability Jo voice their criticism.
2. The Public Official Exception and the Constitutional Grounds
for Its Rejection in Singapore
In light of this imbalance between the right of protecting a
public official's reputation and the right to free speech, Singapore
courts need to assess whether strict liability is the appropriate
84. See Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, [19921 2 S.L.R. 310; Goh Chok Tong v. Tang
Liang Hong, [19971 2 S.L.R. 641; Lee Kuan Yew v. Chee Soon Juan, [20131 3 S.L.R. 8; Lee
Kuan Yew v. Jeyaretnam, [1979] 1 M.L.J. 281 (Sing.); Lee Kuan Yew v. Seow Khee Leng,
[1989] 1 M.L.J 172; Lee Kuan Yew v. Davis, [1990] 1 M.L.J. 390.
85. Chua Mui Hoong, Is Singapore's Legal System Getting a Bad Name?, THE
STRAITSTIMES, Oct. 25, 1997, at 66.
86. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, 19921 2 S.L.R. at 333.
87. Id. (quoting GATLEY ON LIBEL AND SLANDER 206 n.65 (8th ed.)).
88. Id. at 332.
89. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-45 (1974) (distinguishing
between private individuals and public figures under the Sullivan standard for public
figures).
90. CIA, supra note 1I; BBC News, supra note 19.
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standard to apply in defamation cases involving public officials. A
look at how courts in other common law jurisdictions appropriate
the burden of proof might serve as persuasive authority for
Singapore courts.
In the United States, an exception has been created in which
the burden of proving truth no longer lies with the defendant when
the plaintiff is a public official. New York Times v. Sullivan"
eradicated the strict liability standard 2 and established that when
the defendant utters defamatory statements in relation to public
officials and their official conduct, the plaintiff must prove the
defendant made the false statements with actual malice, that is,
with knowledge or reckless indifference to the falsehood. 3 Finding
that the common law presumption of falsity had a chilling effect on
the First Amendment right to free speech,94 the U.S. Supreme
Court arrived at this standard of actual malice based on the
"principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open.,
95
The defense counsel in Jevaretnam raised the Sullivan public
official exception, arguing that Jeyaretnam's speech addressed
Prime Minister Lee's official conduct surrounding Minister Teh's
suicide and thus the actual malice standard should instead be
applied. 6 The court refused to follow Sullivan, however, on the
ground that, while the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
U.S. Constitution prohibit the federal and state governments from
enacting laws that abridge free speech, the second clause of Article
14 of the Singapore Constitution expressly allows Parliament to
restrict the right of free speech and expression guaranteed by the
first clause of the same article.' In line with these provisions, the
court concluded that the right of free speech and expression is
thereby not absolute"8 and legislative restrictions, such as the
Defamation Act, are not inconsistent with Article 14 of the
Singapore Constitution." Based on this difference between the
91. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
92. David M. Cohn, The Problem of Indirect Defamation: Omission of Material Facts,
Implication, and Innuendo, 1993 U. C-ll. LEGAL F. 233, 237 (1993).
93. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
94. Id. at 300.
95. Id. at 27(0.
96. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, [199212 S.L.R. at 326, 327.
97. Id. at 33(1 (citing U.S. CONST. amends. I, XIV and SING. CONST. art 14).
98. Id. at 332.
99. Id. at 331.
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Constitution of the United States and that of Singapore, the court
rejected the public official exception and held that public officials
should not be treated differently from private individuals with
respect to the level of acceptable criticism. .o
3. Emerging Trend of Common Law Jurisdictions Adopting the
Fundamental Free Speech Principles Underlying the Public
Official Exception
Although, Singapore's common law standards for defamation
differ from those of the United States,'0 ' Singapore courts should
not turn a blind eye to the public official exception, because there
is an emerging trend of common law jurisdictions adopting the
fundamental free speech principles underlying the public official
exception. 0 2 The following Commonwealth cases illustrate how
Australian and British courts have engaged in a comparative
analysis of Sullivan when free speech protection needed
expansion.
Several Australian cases show Sullivan's influence on the
courts." For example, in Theophanous v. Herald and Weekly
Times Ltd., the Australian High Court found in favor of the
defendant, who had published a letter questioning the plaintiff's
fitness to hold office as a Member of Parliament.'0 The court
reasoned that, although Sullivan referred to the U.S.
Constitution's First Amendment free speech guarantee, the U.S.
approach was not entirely irrelevant in Australia.'0 5 The court
argued that Australia's common law of defamation provided
defenses, such as fair comment and privilege, to balance the
public's free speech interest with protecting one's reputation.
'06
There is still no guarantee, however, that these defamation
defenses adequately protect against chilling free speech.""
100. Id. at 332-33.
101. See Marlene A. Nicholson, McLibel A Case Study In English Defamation Law, 18
WIS. INT'L L.J. 1, 35 (2000) (compares U.S. defamation law, which is no longer a strict
liability action, with English defamation law, which is similar to that of Singapore).
102. See Gehan N. Gunaskekara, Judicial Reasoning by Analogy with Statutes: Now an
Accepted Technique in New Zealand?, 19 STATUTE L. REV. 177, t81 (1998).
103. Id.
104. Theophanous v. Herald and Weekly Times Ltd., (1993-1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, 117-
18 (Austl.).
105. Id. at 130.
106. Id. at 131.
107. Id. at 131-32.
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Despite agreeing with Sullivan, the court did not adopt the
actual malice test. Instead, it provided that the defendant could
have a complete defense if the defendant can demonstrate that
"(a) it was unaware of the falsity of the material published; (b) it
did not publish the material recklessly, that is, not caring whether
the material was true or false; and (c) the publication was
reasonable in the circumstances.""" The court adopted this test to
better suit Australian values. Nonetheless, the court drew heavily
from Sullivan. Just as the Sullivan test requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of falsity,'0 9  the
Theophanous test requires the defendant to demonstrate lack of
knowledge in the falsity of the statements concerning public
officials."
Courts in Britain have also been influenced by the Sullivan
decision. In Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,
the court found in favor of the defendant, who had published
articles questioning the propriety of certain investments made by
the plaintiffs (members of the Derbyshire County Council)."' The
court reasoned that while Sullivan referred to the U.S.
Constitution's First Amendment on free speech, the underlying
public interest considerations apply equally in Britain."2 In
particular, the court argued, "It is of the highest public importance
that a democratically elected governmental body... should be
open to uninhibited public criticism. '  Like the court in
Theophanous, the court in Derbyshire was especially wary of how
defamation laws could chill free speech, noting that these laws
amount to "political censorship of the most insidious and
objectionable kind.""1
4
Thus, as demonstrated in Derbyshire and Theophanous,
common law jurisdictions like Britain and Australia agree with
Sullivan's underlying free speech principles. Both courts recognize
108. Id. at 141.
109. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 280.
110. Theophanous, (1993-1994) 182 C.L.R. at 141.
Ill. See Derbyshire County Council v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [19931 1 All. E.R.
1011, 1101 (Eng. H.L. 1993).
112. Id. at 1018.
113. Id. at 1(117.
114. Id. at 1018 (quoting Lord Bridge in Hector v. A-G of Antigua and Barbuda,
[19901 2 All E.R. 103, 106 (Eng. P.C. 1990)).
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that in cases where the plaintiff is a public official and the burden
of proof is on the defendant, defamation laws can chill free speech.
4. Leveling the Playing Field: Justifications for Adopting the
Public Official Exception
In view of the emerging trend of common law jurisdictions
adopting the free speech principles underlying the public official
exception, there are many reasons why Singapore courts should
follow suit. First, as Singapore courts have often referred to
decisions from other common law jurisdictions to establish their
own common law,'15 they could similarly look to Derbyshire and
Theophanous as persuasive authority to adopt Sullivan's
underlying free speech principles.
Moreover, due to Singapore's colonial history, Singapore's
common law of defamation closely resembles that of Britain. Both
jurisdictions favor protecting the plaintiff's reputation,'1 6 both
place the burden of proving truth on the defendant, "7 both do not
distinguish between public or private individuals,' 8 and both refer
to their respective Defamation Acts.' " Given these similarities,
Derbyshire should be applicable in Singapore.
One significant difference, however, is that Britain does not
have a written constitution protecting free speech, while both the
U.S. Constitution and the Singapore Constitution expressly
guarantee the right to free speech. 2" This difference, however, did
not prevent the court in Derbyshire from adopting the free speech
principles underlying Sullivan. 2' Thus, in Jeyaretnam, the court's
refusal to follow the Sullivan decision because of the difference
between Singapore's Constitution and that of the United States is
unjustified in light of Derbyshire.
115. E.g., Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, [1992] 2 S.L.R. at 320-21 (citing Sim v.
Stretch, [1936] 2 All E.R. 1237, 1240 (Eng. H.L. 1936)).
116. Gregory T. Walters, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications Inc.: The Clash
Between Protection of Free Speech in the United States and Great Britain, 16 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 895,931 (1993).
117. Id. at 909.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Compare Walters, supra note 116, at 908 with SING. CONST. art. 14; see Douglas
W. Vick, The Human Rights Act and the British Constitution, 37 TEX. INT'L L.J. 329, 331-
32 (2002).
121. See Derbyshire, [1993] 1 All E.R. at 1018.
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Second, in Theophanous and Derbyshire, the courts
emphasized the importance of protecting the right to free speech
in a democratic society, especially when criticizing public officials.
As Lord Bridge aptly stated, "In a free democratic society it is
almost too obvious to need stating that those who hold office in
government and who are responsible for public administration
must always be open to criticism."'2 2 Given that Jeyaretnam, Tang,
and Chee are similar to Theophanous and Derbyshire (they all
involve defamation suits brought by public officials against private
individuals),23 Lord Bridge's point should be equally applicable in
Singapore. By adopting the public official exception, the Singapore
courts would ensure the free exchange of ideas in the political
arena.
Third, because defamation laws can chill free speech, 24
Singapore courts should heed the Theophanous court's advice, that
is, to minimize the chilling effect on free speech by shifting the
burden of proving malice to the plaintiff. 25 This shift in the burden
of proof is particularly apt in Singapore, since political opponents,
such as Jeyaretnam, Tang and Chee, are at an unfair disadvantage
relative to public officials for the reasons already given. 26
Fourth, if Singapore's common law of defamation tips the
balance in favor of protecting a public official's reputation, some
commentators argue that applying the public official exception
would tip the balance too far in favor of free speech,"' and so,
expanding qualified privilege would, at best, achieve a middle
ground. This approach may work in Commonwealth countries
such as England and Australia, where qualified privilege is
available as a defense. In Singapore, however, Article 14 of the
Defamation Act precludes qualified privilege specifically in
situations when defamatory statements are material to an
122. See id. (quoting Lord Bridge in Hector, [19901 2 All E.R. at 106): Theophanous,
(1993-1994) 182 C.L.R. at 130 ("[The] implication of freedom of communication, the
purpose of which is to ensure the efficacy of representative democracy, must extend to
protect political discussion from exposure to onerous criminal and civil liability....").
123. Compare Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, 119921 2 S.L.R. 310, Goh Chok Tong v.
Tang Liang Hong, [1997] 2 S.L.R. 641, and Chee Soon Juan, 3 S.L.R. 8, with Theophanous,
(1993-1994) 182 C.L.R. 104, and Derbyshire, [19931 I All E.R. 111.
124. See Theophanous, (1993-1994) 182 C.L.R. at 132.
125. id. at 185.
126. Supra Part I1.
127. Susanna Frederick Fischer, Rethinking Sullivan: New Approaches in Australia,
New Zealand, aid England, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 101, 185 (2(112).
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election.12' For example, in Jeyaretnam, the court rejected
Jeyaretnam's defense of qualified privilege, 29 stating that "the
right of free speech under art[icle] 14 is subject to the common law
of defamation as modified by the Defamation Act,"'3 and
"Parliament has thus legislated that the circumstances of a general
election are not sufficient to give rise to an occasion of
privilege." ''
With this legislative provision in place to protect the
reputation of public officials, the courts have a duty in the name of
judicial review to serve as a check on the executive branch and
prevent PAP members from muzzling political opponents, such as
Jeyaretnam, Tang, and Chee, who participate in election rallies
and engage in political debate. Thus, adopting the public official
exception in Singapore would not be an extreme measure, since it
would serve to offset the absence of qualified privilege as a
defense in defamation cases involving public officials.
Fifth, certain Australian states have rejected the public
official exception because litigation by public figures has not
significantly decreased in the United States since the Sullivan
decision. 32 A recent study reveals, however, that the rate of
defamation suits filed in the Sydney Supreme Court is at least
eighty times greater than that filed in U.S. courts. 33 The study also
reveals that there is a greater proportion of public officials as
defamation plaintiffs in Australia than in the United States. 34 If
accurate, these findings would support the assertion that requiring
plaintiffs to prove malice would discourage public officials from
bringing defamation suits.
128. Defamation Act, 1985. c. 75, § 14 (Sing.).
129. Jeyaretnam v. Lee Kuan Yew, [19921 2 S.L.R. at 337.
130. Id. at 331.
131. Id. at 336.
132. Michael Newcity, The Sociology of Defamation in Australia and the United States,
26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 5 (quoting ATTORNEYS-GENERAL OF QUEENSLAND, NEW SOUTH
WALES AND VICTORIA, DISCUSSION PAPER (No. 2), REFORM OF DEFAMATION LAWS
(1990)).
133. Id. at 64.
134. Id. at 19.
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5. Staying Within the Four Corners of Singapore's Constitution
and Adapting to Changing Local Conditions
By refusing to accept the public official exception based on
the difference between the U.S. Constitution and the Singapore
Constitution, the court in Jeyaretnam took the approach adopted
in State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya.
That is, the Jeyaretnam court opted to interpret Singapore's
Constitution within its four corners. 1 5 This approach prohibits the
court from using foreign cases to develop jurisprudence within the
limits of the Singapore Constitution, and to establish an
autochthonous legal system according to the country's local
conditions.
36
One of these conditions is cultural values, or "Asian values,"
as popularized by Singapore's former Prime Minister, Lee Kuan
Yew.13' Human rights, as defined by Asian values, are not universal
but ethnocentric. 3 In contrast to Western ideals of democracy,
Asian values advance community interests over individual
interests. This is known as communitarianism.139 To further the
interest of the community, the government and the people enter
into a social contract whereby civil and political liberties are
sacrificed for the sake of economic efficiency and stability, much
like the contract between the Leviathan and its subjects, as
espoused by Thomas Hobbes.
This contract is what drives Singapore's economic engine. In
fact, the great extent to which the government has taken on the
responsibility of maintaining social order and public welfare has
earned the nation the sobriquet of "the nanny state.' 141 For
135. Gov't of the State of Kelantan v. Gov't of the Fed'n of Malaya, [1963] 29 M.L.J.
355, 358 (1963).
136. E.g., Attorney Gen. v. Wain, [1991] 2 M.L.J. 525, 531 (Sing.) (In determining the
issue of whether there was contempt of court, the judge emphasized the importance of
taking into consideration the country's local conditions, namely, the fact that there are no
jury trials in Singapore.)
137. South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, Singapore: Asia's Gilded Cage,
at http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF55.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2004).
138. Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of "Western
Universalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 60, 81, 83 (Joanne
R. Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds.. 1999) (comparing Asian and Western political ideals and
practices and discusses the universal treatment of human rights).
139. See BENG-HUAT CHUA, COMMUNITARIAN IDEOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY IN
SINGAPORE 210 (1995).
140. Bernice Han, Singapore's Free Speech Site Turns Piree to Little Fanfare Amid
Shmp, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Sept. 1, 2103, LEXIS, Agence France Presse File.
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example, in 2000, the government designated a park space, known
as Speakers' Corner, to serve as a platform for people to speak
their mind, albeit not without restrictions."' Speakers cannot use
any sound amplification devices, must be citizens, register for a
police permit, and refrain from comments that are libelous, touch
on religion, or offend the law.'
4 2
This concept of communitarianism is based on the assumption
that maintaining stability in the community necessarily precludes
the full enjoyment of human rights. True, political speech can
incite social unrest, but what about good faith political criticism? Is
there evidence to show that a blanket restriction on political
dissent will guarantee stability? In fact, suppressing dissent may
only fuel hatred towards the government, which would eventually
lead to instability. To say that the Western model of democracy
would not be appropriate in the Asian society does not hold true
in light of recent events in Asia. A prime example is the march
that took place in Hong Kong on July 1, 2003, when 500,000
people demonstrated peaceably against the government's
proposed anti-subversion legislation.' 43 Instead of causing social
disorder, the march resulted in positive change, namely the
postponement and reconsideration of the government's proposed
anti-subversion legislation, which if passed, could have potentially
abridged the right to free speech. Thus, even under the Asian
values argument, it is unnecessary to trade off civil and political
rights for economic stability.
The concept of communitarianism is also based on the
assumption that the community can be treated as separate from
the individual. The community's interest is by definition the sum of
individual interests, however. If the community is treated as a
separate entity, how does one determine what the community's
interests are when individual interests have no significance in a
communitarian society? Compounding this dilemma is the fact
that a racially diverse community, such as Singapore, cannot be
said to hold common cultural values. In other words, the term
Asian values itself is ambiguous. Which cultural values in
141. Conor O'Clery, Speakers' Corner that Puts a Limit on the Message, IRISH TIMES,
Sept. 4, 2000, at 13; Seth Mydans, 'Tom, Dick and Harry' of Singapore Tasting Freedom of
Speakers' Corner, CHI. TRIBUNE, Sept. 3, 2000, at C18.
142. O'Clery, supra note 141, at 13; Mydans, supra note 141, at C18.
143. HK to Secure Broad Public Support Before Restarting Security Bill Legislation,
AFX NEWS ASIA, Sept. 18, 2003, LEXIS, AFX-Asia File.
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particular does it refer to, especially when there is a myriad of
cultures in Asia?
Nevertheless, even if communitarianism continues to have a
stronghold in Singapore, Asian values are not static; they evolve
according to changing local conditions. The country's Former
Prime Minister Lee recently admitted, "[Tihe old system, the old
paradigm is no longer valid under these new circumstances, and
that we have to change."' 44 In agreement, Prime Minister Goh
recently stated, "The next few years, I would think, we should be
able to continue on the path of being more open, and getting
people to be more participative in the affairs of the state."
1 45
Establishing the Speakers' Corner can be seen as a first step
in the government's willingness to tolerate a greater degree of free
speech in this nanny state. In fact, the Speakers' Corner was
instituted partially as a response to Chee's arrest after he made a
speech at a public locale without a permit. 146 If more individuals
were to voice their dissent, as did the 500,000 strong in Hong
Kong, imagine the positive change that could result in Singapore.
Thus, if local conditions set the standard by which the court
constructs the four corners of the Singapore Constitution, then the
court must recognize that room for political dissent has expanded,
even if by a little. As Singapore's society has changed and
developed, public interest calls for Singapore courts to adjust
accordingly the standard it applies in defamation cases involving
public officials.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is little room for the free flow of ideas and opinions if
political players silence each other with defamation suits. Public
officials in Singapore have persistently and successfully used this
legal tactic to stifle political dissent, and this has amounted to an
abuse of judicial responsibility. To restore the requisite balance
between protecting a public official's reputation and the right to
free speech, Singapore courts should adopt the public official
144. Zuraidah Ibrahim, SM: I'll Be in Govt as Long as I'm Able, STRAITS TIMES, Sept.
14, 2003, available at http://app.sgnews.gov.sg/data/Interviews/20030914.htm.
145. Press Release, Singapore Government, Transcript of Prime Minister Goh Chok
Tong's Interview with Ms. Lorraine Hahn of CNN Programme "Talkasia," (Jan. 24, 2004),
available at http://app.sprinter.gov.sg/data/pr/2004(0)12402.htn (last visited Apr. 22, 2003).
146. O'Clery, supra note 141, at 13.
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exception and place the burden of proving malice on public
officials.
If the judiciary continues to allow public officials to use court
proceedings as a forum to weed out political dissenters, individuals
who fall prey to their defamation suits will be without recourse to
exercise their fundamental right to free speech as guaranteed by
the Singapore Constitution. At the moment, they lack adequate
international fora in which to protect this right: Singapore has not
accepted compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice; it is not a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,14 and Asia has yet to establish a regional
human rights system comparable to that of Europe, America, and
Africa.
The nanny state's stranglehold over free expression not only
affects its own citizens, but could also potentially affect others
beyond the shores of this island republic. Singapore's reproachable
practice of public officials misusing defamation laws might set an
example for other countries in the region to follow. Thus, it is vital
that Singapore courts create proper safeguards for free expression
and break Singapore's regrettable tradition of chilling free speech
with defamation laws.
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